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…presumably, we do sometimes think of Venus and, pre-
sumably, we do so in virtue of a causal relation between 
it and us. But there’s no practical hope of making science 
out of this relation.
Fodor (1980)
ABSTRACT: The paper considers (causal) semantic externalism as a potential basis for 
an empirical research program in semantics and claims that externalism has not and 
cannot deliver in this respect. Externalism claims that content, at least for certain 
classes of expressions or concepts, is, at least in part, determined or individuated 
by factors external to the individual, the latter usually being cashed out as causal 
relations to the environment; internalism, on the other hand, claims that content is 
fully determined by factors internal to the individual. Externalism is criticized in its 
diachronic and its synchronic variety, and it is concluded that, for the purposes of 
a feasible empirical research program in semantics, organism-environment relations 
should not be seen as constitutive of content, but only as potential props for eliciting 
content, which should be seen as a mental/neural structure. The problem behind all 
forms of externalism is diagnosed as a certain misapplication or abuse of what I have 
termed the interpretative scheme, the assumption of which seems to be a necessary 
precondition for doing semantic description.
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1. Ways to study meaning and preconditions thereof
What is it to study meaning? The question could be posed with the intent to 
‘characterize the abstract form of a [semantic] theory’ (Katz & Fodor 1964: 
479; cf. also Dummett 1975, 1976). However, there is no particular reason 
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to suppose that there is a single form that a theory of meaning must conform 
to, nor does an overview of the current situation in theorizing about mean-
ing lead one to suppose that any kind of general consensus as to this form is 
forthcoming. Rather, one should assume that there will be several such forms 
attempting to describe meaning in language, and I will begin this paper by 
giving a brief overview of the most prominent ones.
To study meaning has to involve, at some point, breaking out of the 
‘circle of language’. Unless this step is taken, what one gets is merely a trans-
lational semantics, one that issues in statements of the following sort: ‘“A” 
means the same as “B”’ – statements that substitute one expression for an-
other, giving no deeper insight into the nature of meaning (Davidson’s 1984 
theory of meaning is characterized by Dummett 1975 as being of this kind, 
although the verdict is later revoked1). But now, breaking out of the circle of 
language can be done in several ways, and this seems to be the point where, 
depending on how it is done, theories of meaning will assume different 
forms. There seem to be three basic ways of doing this (perhaps they exhaust 
the possibilities, but I will not claim this).
One way to break out of the circle of language is to attempt to connect 
linguistic expressions to objects and states of affairs ‘in the world’ (or, rather, 
model of the world). This will result in formal semantic theories of familiar 
varieties (cf. Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet 2000, Larson & Segal 1995). 
These theories will begin with axioms specifying the extensions of the primi-
tive terms of the language (the extension being the set of things to which 
a term applies), and will then, for any arbitrary sentence of the language, 
spell out its truth-conditions (namely, states of affairs the obtaining of which 
would make it true) by composing them out of the relations among exten-
sions of the primitive terms used in the sentence.
Another way to break out of the circle of language is to connect linguis-
tic expressions to concepts. The goal of these kinds of theories (e. g. Jackend-
off 1983, Croft & Cruse 2004) is to elucidate meaning in terms of analyzing 
the concepts that are activated when certain linguistic expressions are used or 
encountered. A full analysis of meaning will then be given as an account of 
the conceptual structure (a mental phenomenon) that underlies our use of 
language.
Yet another way to break out of the circle of language is to attempt 
to connect linguistic expressions to practices. These are the use theories of 
meaning (for one of the most recent formulations cf. Horwich 2005). These 
theories will attempt a reduction of meaning-properties of linguistic expres-
sions to use-properties: they will account for the meaning of an expression in 
terms of its law of use, a regularity or know-how.
1 In the Appendix, cf. p. 128.
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These, then, are the several research programs in semantics (taken to 
be clusters of theories sharing fundamental assumptions), attempting to de-
scribe meaning in natural language.
The question that now poses itself is: what is the basis on which we judge 
whether a certain account of meaning is successful or not? This basis is, like 
in any science, successful prediction. Amongst the things that a semantic 
theory has to predict are the following: for isolated words, categorization 
responses of speakers; for words in sentences, syntactic behavior; for pairs (or 
sets) of sentences, logico-semantic relations such as entailment or contradic-
tion. What is sought after are confirmed empirical predictions.
So, these different descriptions of meaning will be tested against data 
provided by speakers, of the sorts enumerated above.
According to many semanticists, the logico-semantic relations between 
sentences are one of the most important things that a semantic theory has 
to get right. If we assume, for the purposes of illustration, that speakers are 
prone to take the sentence ‘Fritz is a cat’ as entailing the sentence ‘Fritz is 
an animal’, we might sketch how the several theories (research programs) 
outlined above might attempt to account for this.The formal theories, if they 
construe the extension of ‘cat’ to be a subset of the extension of ‘animal’, will 
predict the entailment relation correctly, based on set-theoretic relations just 
mentioned. The conceptualist theories will account for the entailment by 
either taking the concept ANIMAL to be part of the concept CAT2, or by 
taking the latter concept to be subordinated to the former in a conceptual 
taxonomy. Finally, the use theories might account for the entailment relation 
by taking the sentence ‘A cat is an animal’ to belong to the set of sentences 
specified by the law of use for the word as being meaning-constituting.
Now, my goal in this paper is not to adjudicate between these several 
research programs (the example above obviously leaves them on a par). It 
is rather to inquire whether a more ambitious goal with regard to the de-
scription of meaning might be attainable – one inspired by a position in the 
philosophy of language and mind called semantic externalism. Putnam ends 
his seminal 1975 paper by proposing a ‘normal form for the description of 
meaning’ (269), where one of the components is the description of the exten-
sion (which, as he famously claims, isn’t determined by what’s ‘in the head’). 
The main question I want to pose in this paper is this: is this additional re-
quirement on the project of describing meaning, adumbrated by externalism, 
feasible?
Before I proceed to the main issue, I would like to point out the fol-
lowing: any description program in semantics presupposes what I will term 
2 I will adopt the following standard graphical convention: words are referred to by 
putting them in quotes, whereas concepts are referred to by words in capital letters.
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the interpretative scheme3 as its necessary background. In assigning mean-
ing/content to utterances, the semanticist has to assume an external stand-
point: she has to have independent recourse to objects and events that are 
being talked about in the utterances that are the object of analysis. In formal 
semantics, the semanticist has to build a model of the world, in order to be 
able to assign to expressions their extensions, and this model is given from 
the standpoint of the semanticist (as interpreter, external observer), couched 
in her concepts. In conceptualist semantics, the semanticist attempts to ana-
lyze the mental structure of the speakers/hearers, the concepts activated upon 
using/encountering certain expressions, but has to retain independent access 
to the objects that the concepts are concepts of, in order to be able to say 
what the concepts are concepts of (even though a speaker/hearer only has 
access to cats, as it were, via her concept of cats, the semanticist can assume 
the external observer position and differentiate between the concept being 
analyzed, and its referents). In use-theoretic semantics, even though, as Hor-
wich (2005: 78) puts it, ‘there is no need for a word’s law of use to relate 
occurrences of that word to members of its extension’, the semanticist still 
has to be able to talk about the members of the extension, and identify them 
independently.
So the interpretative scheme is a necessary precondition for doing scien-
tific semantic description. In the third section, I will suggest that the problem 
with an externalistically-based description program is a certain misapplica-
tion or abuse of the interpretative scheme.
2. On externalism
Externalism and internalism in current philosophy of language and mind are 
usually construed as metaphysical positions, positions on what determines or 
individuates (linguistic, mental) content4, on what content supervenes on. 
Externalism claims that content, at least for certain classes of expressions or 
concepts, is, at least in part, determined or individuated by factors external 
to the individual, that content supervenes on the conjunction of internal and 
external factors, the latter usually being cashed out as causal relations to the 
environment5. Internalism, on the other hand, claims that content is fully 
3 Using the term ‘the interpretative scheme’ might call to mind the influential proposals 
of Dennett (1987) and Davidson (2001) regarding such matters. However, my notion of the 
interpretative scheme is much less theoretically loaded and I will outline it briefly above.
4 For the purposes of this paper, I won’t draw any kind of important distinction between 
linguistic and mental content.
5 I will not in this article discuss Burge’s (1979) social externalism, founded on the ‘art-
hritis’ thought experiment. I am here concerned with causal externalism only.
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determined by factors internal to the individual, that it supervenes exclusively 
on internal factors (cf. Kallestrup 2012, also Schantz 2004).6
I propose to assess these positions with regard to the question which 
seems a better candidate to form the basis of a successful empirical research 
program in semantics. It might be claimed that this practical concern is irrel-
evant to the metaphysical truth of externalism or internalism. Metaphysical 
truth is, however, notoriously hard to come by, metaphysical conclusions be-
ing fragile and, more often than not, inconclusive. So, it might be useful to 
adopt, at least for the time being, this practical standpoint, and to inquire 
into the prospects of these positions as bases of empirical research programs. 
Indeed, externalism and internalism are sometimes treated explicitly as re-
search methodologies (‘… internalism and externalism are fully general re-
search methodologies …, Hinzen 2006: 122). I will treat them, however, as 
potential bases for research programs, and attempt to investigate which seems 
to be the better candidate for the job. The outcome, if correct, might not 
speak directly to the truth of these positions, but that is not my concern here 
– the concern is rather to pick the more promising candidate for the job at 
hand (however, cf. Mendola 2008 for the most elaborate criticism known to 
me of externalist doctrines with regard to their metaphysical content).
I suppose internalism is the default position. Not, to be sure, in the sense 
of statistical prevalence in current theorizing, where externalism seems to be 
the dominant position, one that has acquired the status of the standard view. 
By ‘default position’ I mean one that seems prima facie the most natural or 
intuitive. Indeed, when Putnam (1975) and Kripke (1980) set forth their 
externalist arguments that turned the tide in the contemporary philosophy of 
language and mind, they were challenging a view that was taken for granted, 
that no one before them thought to question. The rest is history, as they say.
But I don’t think the history has been a happy one. What I will argue 
here is that, although externalism made some incisive points about language 
and mind that no one can afford to disregard, it is hopeless as the basis of em-
pirical research into meaning (although it was originally envisioned as such 
– cf. the reference to Putnam’s ‘normal form for the description of meaning’ 
above). In the almost forty years since it was proposed, externalism has, as 
far as I can tell, not inspired any kind of semantic research that was able to 
yield interesting empirical results. Internalistically-based research programs 
have, on the other hand, delivered quite a lot, it seems. Detailed descriptions 
of large classes of expressions are available, cf. Larson & Segal (1995) in the 
formal tradition or Jackendoff (1990) in the conceptualist tradition. Putnam 
does allow for, in his normal form for the description of meaning, describing 
what’s in the head (syntactic markers, semantic markers, and ‘stereotypes’) 
6 Externalism and internalism are also positions in epistemology, but that is for the most 
part an independent debate. Cf. Goldberg (2007).
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– but it seems that this is all that can be hoped to be successfully describable 
in doing semantics. Externalism fails precisely where its most characteris-
tic aspect comes into play, namely a request to study organism-environment 
interaction.
Internalism claims that whatever is described whilst studying meaning 
must ultimately be cashed out as something that is in the head, a neural 
structure. Externalism claims that a full description of meaning will at least 
partly be concerned with describing causal relations between the organism 
and its environment. This idea of causal relations between the organism and 
the environment being relevant to content can take different forms, however, 
and so externalism can appear in different varieties.
On the most general level, however, causal semantic externalism seems 
to come in one of two forms. Either it is claimed that certain causal contact 
between an organism, a user of a term, and the environment, that occurred at 
some point in time (in the past, of course), has fixed the meaning of the term, 
and forever holds it fixed (renewed causal contact may strengthen or confirm 
this fixing, but is inessential); or it is claimed that the causal relation between 
the organism and the environment that is relevant to meaning is causal co-
variance that occurs under certain circumstances. I will term the first kind of 
externalism diachronic externalism and the second synchronic externalism.
Diachronic externalism is the standard Kripke-Putnam story (a version 
of it, with troublesome consequences for externalism itself, is Davidson’s 
2001 externalism). The most prominent contemporary version of synchronic 
externalism is Fodor’s (1990b, 1994, 1998, 2008). There are of course many 
other versions of semantic externalism on the market, e. g. those of Dretske 
(1981) or the teleological theories of Millikan and Papineau (for an overview 
cf. Loewer 1997), but they seem to fall into one of the two categories given 
above (or are a combination of the two), with the most prominent versions 
being those of Putnam-Kripke and Fodor, respectively.
I will claim that a semantic research program based on either diachronic 
or synchronic externalism is not feasible. I will attempt to show that the only 
feasible research program7 in semantics goes from the outside in – namely it 
7 By ‘research program’ I have in mind here a program more general than the three pro-
grams outlined in part one, a program that can accommodate any one of them, as long as 
they study meaning as an internal aspect of the mind. I see no obstacle to construing formal 
semantics in such a way (the Larson & Segal 1995 version lends itself most easily to such a con-
strual). As for the use theories, at least the Horwich (2005) version that I am relying on here as 
representative seems to be amenable to a mentalistic construal. If the meaning of a word-type is, 
on that account, constituted by a law of use for that word, which dictates the acceptance condi-
tions of certain specified sentences containing the word, whereas accepting a sentence is under-
stood as a having that sentence in one’s ‘belief box’, which is a psychological phenomenon, there 
is no obstacle as seeing this approach to meaning as also being basically mentalistic. 
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treats the environment only as a prop, as a way of getting at what’s in the 
heads of speakers/thinkers, and not as in any way constitutive of content.
2.1. Diachronic externalism
Diachronic externalism, as established by Putnam and Kripke, and given 
textbook form by Devitt & Sterelny (1999), is the position that, at least for 
some of our terms, at the point of their introduction into the language there 
occurred a reference-fixing, a content-conferring event, that determined the 
content of those terms. So, in the case of names, there was presumably a ‘dub-
bing ceremony’ where the name was causally grounded in its bearer. This hap-
pened in the following fashion: the object being named, in being perceived 
by those present at the ceremony, causally affected them, caused them to have 
certain thoughts about itself, and thereby the name was ‘locked’ to its bearer. 
Later the name was passed on to others who borrowed it from the original 
dubbers, or from those who in turn borrowed it from the original dubbers, 
etc., and so a causal-historical link was established leading back to the origi-
nal object and the ur-event of its naming. This ur-event, given a certain point 
in time when the name is used, could have occurred years or centuries or mil-
lennia prior to that point, and all knowledge about the original name-bearer 
could have, at that point, been lost or distorted, but nevertheless using the 
name will result in successful reference to the object in virtue of the causal 
link leading back to the original event (and on the condition that the name 
is used with the intention to refer to the same thing that the original dubbers 
referred to).
This position was motivated by criticism of the earlier description 
theories of the reference of names, according to which what determines the 
reference/content of a name is a description or cluster of descriptions that 
speakers associate with it and that uniquely identifies its referent. In his fam-
ous examples with Jonah and Gödel, Kripke showed that such identifying 
descriptions are neither necessary nor sufficient for successful reference. Even 
in the absence of correct identifying descriptions, and even in the case that 
the descriptions associated with a name in fact identify someone other than 
the intended name-bearer, the name can be used to refer successfully to its 
intended bearer, in virtue of the link connecting the name-user to the name-
bearer (the referent).
Descriptions were introduced into the semantics of names as a way of 
cashing out the Fregean notion of sense. Frege (1892) famously argued that 
names have to have senses because there has to be an aspect of the meaning of 
co-referential names that differentiates between them, and since the reference 
is in this case the same, it has to be something else – viz. sense as a mode of 
presentation of the referent. It is sense that is used to account for the informa-
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tiveness of identity statements where coreferential names flank the identity 
sign. The causal theory of reference recognizes this issue, and preserves the 
notion of sense, but construes it as the property of referring to the object by 
a certain type of causal link. So, on this account, co-referential names will be 
causally linked to the same object, but by different causal links, and therefore 
have different senses.
In addition to names, this causal theory of content is also standardly ap-
plied to natural kind terms, such as ‘water’ or ‘gold’. The externalist approach 
to natural kind terms was of course established by Putnam’s famous Twin 
Earth thought experiment. Imagine a distant planet in our universe that is 
a molecule-for-molecule duplicate of Earth, except for the fact that what is 
called ‘water’ on Twin Earth, and what has the same phenomenal properties 
as water (the liquid that appears here on Earth), doesn’t have the chemical 
structure H2O but rather XYZ. Then, picking a point in time on both plan-
ets before chemistry discovered the structure of the respective liquids, we 
can say that the mental states of the utterers of the word(s) ‘water’ that are 
associated with this (phonological) word as used on Earth and Twin Earth, 
and that carry the knowledge of the phenomenal properties of the respective 
liquids, are the same on both planets, but nevertheless the extension of the 
terms is different, because the stuff referred to is different on the two planets. 
So, given that causal contact responsible for fixing the extension involved, on 
Earth, samples of H2O, but, on Twin Earth, samples of XYZ, ‘water’ as used 
on Earth and Twin Earth refers to different stuffs.
The externalist account of content for natural kind terms, inspired by 
the Twin Earth thought experiment, is this: there has to have occurred an 
initial content-determining event, that locked the term onto the respective 
natural kind, but, as opposed to the case of names, there are complications 
due to the fact that a natural kind term is a general, rather than singular 
term, and so applies to each of a class of entities (viz. those that comprise 
the natural kind). In this case, the term will refer to whatever has the same 
underlying nature or essence as the paradigmatic samples of the kind that the 
original contact was with. The notion of ‘paradigmatic’ samples is brought 
in to ensure that, even though some things (or stuff ) that superficially re-
sembled the members of the intended kind, but were in fact not instances of 
the kind, might have been present at the original dubbing, they wouldn’t be 
included in the extension of the term. Whereas the notion of paradigmatic 
samples ensures the ‘only members of the kind’ condition on the extension of 
the term, the notion of underlying nature or internal structure is supposed to 
ensure the ‘all members of the kind’ condition. This nature needn’t be known 
at the time of the grounding of the term in the kind, but it is what ensures 
the right extension, and is in principle discoverable by science at some later 
point.
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Is there any prospect of an empirical research program that would be 
engendered by the above insights? I don’t think so. The basic problem with 
turning the above externalist claims into an empirical research program is 
that the level of description remains completely unclear. At what level is the 
allegedly content-conferring causal contact supposed to be investigated and 
described? Two levels come to mind: the macrolevel of everyday objects, and 
the microlevel of biochemistry and physics. But is a research program based 
on either capable of delivering any results? Consider a name, like ‘Aristotle’. 
The reference-fixing event belongs to the distant past. We could tell, on the 
macrolevel, some kind of story of how Aristotle’s parents named him ‘Aris-
totle’, how this involved him causally affecting them because of a perceptual 
connection, how this conferred content on the name, etc., but this is only a 
story, and a largely speculative one at that (due to lack of data), out of which 
no science can be made. Telling this story will not deliver any kind of interest-
ing formalizable empirical results with regard to the description of meaning.
What are the prospects on the microlevel? Should we aim to find, via 
some super-duper advanced form of physics, the individual photons that 
bounced off Aristotle and hit his parent’s retinas during the naming cere-
mony? Should we attempt to reconstruct the exact properties of these ret-
inas? Should we search for Aristotle’s DNA, in order to have an exact genetic 
‘fingerprint’ of the referent of the name? This seems to be an impossible task, 
doomed from the start.
Consider now a natural kind term, such as ‘kangaroo’. I’ve never seen 
a real-life one, and some other person (e. g. Michael Devitt) presumably 
has. What accounts for our ability to refer to kangaroos? The externalist will 
claim: the history of some Englishman or Irishman borrowing the term from 
a native of Australia who borrowed it from some other native, etc., all the 
way back to an original aboriginal who baptized the said animals (actually, 
the etymology of the term contains a misunderstanding between the settlers 
and the natives, but let’s assume, for the sake of argument, that there was no 
such misunderstanding). But again, telling this story (needless to add, full 
of gaps and speculation) won’t produce any kind of interesting formalizable, 
empirical addition to the scientific description of meaning.Therefore, the 
search for the presumed reference-fixing event will be irrelevant, and con-
sequently a semantic description program based on diachronic externalism 
will be pointless.
A diachronic externalist, like Davidson, will claim that ‘what our words 
mean is fixed in part by the circumstances in which we learned, and used, 
the words’ (2001b: 29), bringing individual history into the story. But, if 
we followed this idea, there would be no consistent entity to describe: each 
individual’s learning history is different, involving a different object (e.g. a 
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different kangaroo) so we would be forced to attempt to provide descriptions 
of idiosyncratic meanings, by trying to reconstruct these individual histories 
(and again, the level at which such a project is supposed to be carried out is 
unclear).
Of course, diachronic externalists allow for multiple grounding (cf. De-
vitt & Sterelny 1999: 75). This is possible with names and natural kind 
terms whose referents are still present to be interacted with. In these cases, 
it can be claimed that the sporadic causal interaction with the referent re-
peatedly grounds the term in the referent. However, in that case, there is no 
need to search for an original reference-fixing event, because the interaction 
can be directly observed. And so diachronic externalism, as a basis for an 
empirical research program, collapses into synchronic externalism: whatever 
promise externalism might hold as a basis for a successful empirical descrip-
tion program in semantics, it seems to lie in synchronic externalism. I will 
argue, however, that a research program based on synchronic externalism is 
also hopeless.
2.2. Synchronic externalism
If historical study is not the way to go, could it be that an externalistically-
inspired research program in semantics has to proceed by studying presently 
observable organism-environment interaction? More specifically, is (at least 
an aspect of ) meaning to be found in causal co-variance between aspects of 
the organism and aspects of the environment?
This is Fodor’s approach. He (1994: Appendix B) takes Davidson’s 
Swampman argument (2001b: 19–20) to constitute something of a reductio 
of diachronic externalism, and proposes a synchronic co-variational theory 
instead.
The basic idea is this: the concept WATER refers to water, not because 
an initial tokening of it was caused by water, but because tokenings of it would 
be caused by water under appropriate circumstances. Concepts (words)8 have 
the content they do because of reliable causal co-variance between tokenings 
of the concept and instantiations of the property it ‘locks onto’. Fodor allows 
for cases where a tokening of the concept isn’t caused by an instantiation of 
the property; e.g. someone is looking at water but isn’t thinking about it. 
Fodor also allows for cases where a tokening is caused of a concept that is not 
the ‘right one’, viz. not the one that is locked to the property; e.g. someone 
might be looking at water, but be caused by it to think of trees or whatever. 
Fodor can allow for these kinds of cases because what matters is the reliability 
8 Fodor mostly talks about concepts, so I will do the same in this subsection.
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of the causal relation, in light of which exceptions can be tolerated. To put 
it another way, content depends on nomic relations among properties – so, 
if being water and being disposed to cause WATER-tokenings are reliably 
(nomically) connected, as Fodor claims they are, then it won’t matter if there 
are occasional failures of this connection.
A concept might also occur to someone without there being external 
stimulation of the kind that standardly causes tokenings of it; e.g. someone 
might think of water because he is thirsty and there is no water around, so 
in this case the tokening of the concept WATER is caused by certain bodily 
states in the absence of water, rather than presence of it. But again, Fodor 
needn’t be worried by this, because the fact that WATER-tokenings some-
times occur without the presence of water doesn’t refute the reliable connec-
tion between being water and causing WATER-tokenings.
What Fodor does consider to be a difficulty is the so-called disjunc-
tion problem. Namely, since WATER-tokenings are sometimes (by an er-
ror in percept-categorization) caused by something that isn’t water, e.g. by 
transparent jelly, how come WATER doesn’t mean water-or-transparent-jelly? 
Fodor’s reply is asymmetric dependence: he claims that transparent jelly caus-
ing WATER-tokenings asymmetrically depends on water causing WATER-
tokenings. What that means is this: if water didn’t cause WATER-tokenings, 
then neither would transparent jelly, but not vice versa. ‘False tokens are 
metaphysically dependent on true ones’, as he puts it (1990b: 91).
In contrast to the more standard version of externalism presented in the 
previous subsection, Fodor’s externalism has several distinguishing character-
istics (in addition to its synchronic character). First, it is comprehensive, in the 
sense of being meant to apply not only to names and natural kind terms, but 
to all terms in the language, i.e. to all concepts. Second, it is extreme, in the 
sense of claiming that ‘content is constituted, exhaustively, by symbol-world 
relations’ (1998: 14). So, whereas Putnam (1975) allowed for semantic fea-
tures of terms that belonged ‘in the head’ (stereotypes and semantic markers) 
and were the proper subject matter of psycholinguistics, Fodor claims that 
mental processes are exclusively syntactic and so semantics has nothing to 
do with psychology. Semantics, according to Fodor, is the study of symbol-
world relations, which exhaust meaning (content), and are given as reliable 
causal co-variance. Finally, Fodor’s externalism is counterfactual, in the sense 
of construing content as being determined, not by what did happen, but by 
what would happen under certain circumstances.
The main problem with any such causal co-variational theory is of course 
that any particular event that is singled out as a cause of some other event is 
part of a causal network where many (indeed, infinitely many, cf. Field 2003) 
causes acted together to bring about the latter event. So, singling out the 
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cause is a kind of foregrounding, focusing of attention, which also depends 
on construal in terms of grain-size (are we talking about causes at the level of 
events involving medium-sized physical objects or microparticles?). How to 
get the cause out of this, which is meant to be the content of a term(concept)? 
Fodor (2008) proposes to do this by adapting Davidson’s (2001) notion of 
triangulation. According to Davidson, there is no way to tell what in the en-
vironment a creature is responding to (what the contents of its thoughts are), 
or indeed whether it’s responding to something in the environment rather 
than to a surface irritation of its sense-receptors, unless there is a similar 
creature present in the same environment, responding to it, and observing 
(interpreting) the first. Only by locating the common factor (‘triangulating’) 
causing similar responses in the two creatures, by seeing where the causal 
chains intersect, can the content of thought be determined. Fodor embraces 
triangulation as a means of solving the ‘which cause’ problem, but construes 
it counterfactually. So, it is not necessary for the determination of content, 
he claims, that there be an actual second creature present, an interpreter – it 
suffices to consider what would cause the original creature to have a thought 
of the same type if it were located a bit differently in the same environment. 
Again, the point of intersection of causal chains will give us the objective 
content, on this story.
Can synchronic externalism of the Fodor variety provide interesting de-
scriptions of content? Not likely, in my opinion. Again, what kind of research 
program could these insights be turned into? Should we go about investigat-
ing the content of CAT or WATER by checking whether the presence of cats 
or water in the (perceptible) environment correlates with subjects’ thinking 
about cats or water? On the one hand, this would turn out to be a pointless 
exercise. The only way to test the hypothesis would be to present experi-
mental subjects with a cat, or a sample of water, and ask them what they are 
thinking about. Given the situation and the salient fact of being led to focus 
on an entity, most of them would probably be led to say ‘I’m thinking about a 
cat’ or ‘I’m thinking about water’. But what we have here is a highly artificial 
situation, where subjects are basically asked to apply terms to entities in the 
environment (and prefix these terms with ‘I’m thinking about’), and where 
the results are extremely predictable and uninformative. It’s a trivial truth that 
competent speakers of English are able to apply the word ‘cat’ (the concept 
CAT) to cats, so what insight could we ever gain from such an exercise?
Fodor could of course claim that his theory is therefore obviously con-
firmed. But one should be wary of theories that are confirmed before experi-
mentation has even started.
A research program based on synchronic externalism seems pointless, 
therefore. In addition, it seems to lead to dead ends and wrong predictions.
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First, the dead ends. If content is seen as reliable causal co-variance (cum 
asymmetric dependence), what about concepts of fictional entities, such as 
UNICORN? Fodor proposes (1990b: 100–1) to deal with this problem by 
invoking nomic relations among uninstantiated properties: so the property 
of being a unicorn is, he claims, nomologically linked with the property 
of being a cause of UNICORN-tokens even if there aren’t any unicorns. But 
how would we ever test something like this? How would we go about look-
ing for relations among properties of something that doesn’t exist? Fodor can 
claim that the concept UNICORN locks onto the property of being a uni-
corn by virtue of a hypothetical causal co-variance relation, but this sounds 
very much like a just-so statement, rather than an empirical claim. The no-
tion of ‘locking onto’ (or ‘resonating to’, cf. 1998: 137) seems to be a vague 
metaphor that isn’t likely to lead to any kind of empirical research program. 
The only kind of research program with regard to the concept UNICORN 
that would seem to be able to deliver interesting results (or any results) would 
be to use pictures of unicorns, the word ‘unicorn’, etc. to activate a con-
cept in the research subjects’ minds, in order to then attempt to discover the 
structure of this concept and how it is instantiated in the brain. One could 
use examples involving both concepts UNICORN and HORSE to this end, 
e.g. hypothesise that these two concepts share most of their structure (and 
therefore are instantiated in the brain in closely analogous fashion) except for 
a feature specifying that the former concept is one of a fictional entity, and 
then attempt to test these claims on the experimental subjects’ verbal and 
non-verbal responses. However, this research program goes from the outside 
in: it uses certain environmental cues (not necessarily ones that would be 
considered to be content by Fodor’s theory) to get at what is in the head, with 
only that what is in the head being considered to be content, and therefore 
the object of inquiry.
Another example of a dead end that Fodor’s approach leads to is this. On 
his account, a social concept like PUNCTUALITY won’t exhibit any kind of 
interesting difference of kind from a concept like CAT: the former concept 
will lock onto the property of being punctual, the latter concept will lock 
onto the property of being a cat, and that’s that. But is this really all that can 
be said about these concepts?It would seem that being punctual is a property 
that depends on there being a community of people, certain norms and ex-
pectations being in force in this community, there existing certain forms of 
interaction that these norms and expectations apply to, there being minds 
with certain psychological properties, etc. Being a cat depends on none of 
this. Shouldn’t our concepts somehow reflect these differences? Don’t they in 
fact reflect them? We would need to frame hypotheses about the structure of 
a concept like PUNCTUALITY (e. g. that it involves a concept of a norm 
as a constituent of sorts), and then test them by way of psychological experi-
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ments. But again, our hypotheses will have the from-the-outside-in form, 
namely the object of inquiry will be what’s in the head and the environment 
will only serve as a source of cues.
Now for the wrong predictions that the theory makes. Since content 
is given, on Fodor’s account, by a concept locking onto a property whose 
instantiations reliably cause tokenings of the concept, then, for any concept, 
there has to be a single property that it expresses (locks onto). But what is 
this property for a concept such as GAME? As Wittgenstein’s (1953) famous 
example showed, there is no necessary property that something has to pos-
sess in order to be a game. Rather, GAME is a cluster concept (Jackendoff 
2002: 352–6), such that there is no property that something must have in 
order to be a game, no necessary property, although various combinations 
of properties are sufficient for something to be a game. Again it seems that 
an empirical research program will have to look into the form the concept 
GAME has in the mind, viz. how a cluster concept such as this one is actually 
encoded in the mind/brain, whereas Fodor’s approach cannot account for the 
content of this concept. Fodor’s approach will face this kind of problem for 
any such family resemblance concept, and it would seem to be the case that 
many of our concepts are such.
Among other wrong predictions that Fodor’s approach engenders is the 
prediction that words like ‘cat’ and ‘cathood’ will be synonyms, express the 
same concept, or at least coextensive concepts. For, if the concept CAT locks 
onto the property of being a cat and is reliably caused to be tokened by in-
stantiations of this property, what’s the story for CATHOOD? It seems that 
it has to be the same story: CATHOOD-tokens are also caused by instantia-
tions of being a cat and therefore CATHOOD locks onto the same property. 
Fodor’s way of dealing with examples like ‘Jocasta’ and ‘Oedipus’ mother’ is to 
say that they indeed have the same content but differ syntactically at the level 
of language of thought. However, the ‘cat’/’cathood’ problem is the reverse 
of this: these are words/concepts that don’t seem to apply to the same things 
(CAT applies to cats and CATHOOD applies to a property, viz. one of be-
ing a cat), but the theory predicts that they do. If they do lock onto the same 
property, and therefore are the same concept (or coextensive concepts), they 
should be able to enter into the same predication relations, i. e. be mutually 
substitutable. But this isn’t the case: replacing ‘cat’ in ‘A cat is an animal’ by 
‘cathood’ will yield an anomalous sentence/thought. This kind of problem 
can be generated for any concrete noun and an abstract term formed from it. 
The way to successfully differentiate between CAT and CATHOOD would 
seem to lie in accounting for the way abstract concepts function in the mind 
as opposed to concrete ones, but this explanation will not involve system-
atic recourse to organism-environment relations (yes, systematically, there are 
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situations where we can say ‘that X’ if X is a concrete concept but not if it is 
an abstract one – but this is an explanandum rather than an explanans).
Also, there is another kind of wrong prediction plaguing Fodor’s ac-
count, concerning particularly asymmetric dependence, namely the follow-
ing. Uttering the word ‘cat’ will reliably covary with the tokening of the 
concept CAT in the mind of the hearer. There is no reason to believe that 
this causal relation asymmetrically depends on the relation between cats and 
the CAT concept. They seem to be independent relations: for instance, if the 
cats-CAT connection were somehow broken, so that cats didn’t cause the 
tokening of this concept any more, the other relation could still be preserved. 
But then the concept CAT, and any other concept that can be expressed in 
words is ambiguous: its content is both the property that it expresses and the 
word(-type) that can be used to express it.But it is highly implausible that 
the content of a concept is the word used to express it: this seems to have the 
relation the wrong way round. Asymmetric dependence will encounter this 
problem for any concept and a word for it.
Finally, a methodological point concerning Fodor’s recourse to triangu-
lation. The content of a thought is supposed to be pinpointed by figuring out 
where causal chains leading from the world to an observer and her counterf-
actual counterpart intersect when the observer and the counterpart are token-
ing the same concept. However, since it is a presupposition of this method 
that subjects have to be similar (Davidson 2001c: 119) – in order for them to 
have the same reaction to similar phenomena – the option is always open that 
we will find something else that they share, at the organism-internal level. Is 
there something like this? Since Fodor and Davidson restrict triangulation to 
perceptual situations, we can invoke something that is necessary for recogni-
tion of referents of concepts, namely certain visual prototypes of perceptible 
entities encoded in the mind. In order to be able to recognize cats in the 
environment, and to apply the concept CAT to them, there has to exist some 
kind of a visual representation of a typical cat in our minds (Jackendoff 2002, 
relying on the work of Marr, calls this level of cognitive structure spatial struc-
ture). Since the concept is presumably abstract and non-visual, there has to 
be some other kind of mental structure that enables us to recognize instances 
of it in the environment, a certain flexible kind of visual encoding that stores 
schematic representations of perceptible entities. But then, whenever two 
people can be said to have been caused by observing a cat in the environment 
to think of cats, the visual structure will also have been activated, because the 
causal chain has to pass through it. Of course it is natural to say (and think) 
that ‘cat’ refers to cats, and not to internal schematic representations of cats. 
But as far as cognitive science is concerned, it seems clear that the relevant 
object of investigation, in addition to the concept itself, will be this schematic 
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representation and its instantiation in the brain, and not real cats out there 
in the world.
I conclude that synchronic externalism doesn’t seem to be able to form 
the basis of a promising empirical research program in semantics. Even if in 
some metaphysical sense content is ‘out there’, it seems clear what the object 
of study for a cognitive scientist (semanticist) should be. She could choose to 
study cats, water, doorknobs, etc. (whatever any word can be used to refer to 
outside the mind), or she can choose to study the mental structure that the 
mind uses to encode information about these entities, and how this structure 
is encoded in the brain. The way seems pretty clear – and, again, it goes from 
the outside in.
3. Causation and Content
I promised at the end of section one a diagnosis of the problem with exter-
nalism based on a certain misapplication of what I termed the interpretative 
scheme. I claimed that this scheme is a necessary precondition for doing 
semantic description. It involves having independent recourse to the objects 
and events talked about in the sentences that are the object of analysis. So, in 
doing semantics, one has to assume an external standpoint with regard to the 
discourse being analyzed.
However, assuming an external standpoint is not the same as assuming 
an externalist standpoint. It seems to me that externalism is an attempt to 
turn this unavoidable external position into a way towards a full(er) descrip-
tion of meaning. However, this seems to be a non-starter.
As I tried to show in the preceding discussion, there is no systematic, 
tractable, external relation between expressions/concepts and external enti-
ties. Attempts to turn externalistic insights into research programs turn out 
to be either pointless or impossible.
The key difference between externalism and internalism is, I think, in 
the way that the role of the basic causal relation C → E is construed in 
specifying content. Externalism places content (exclusively or partially) in 
the cause, in the external objects that brought about a certain mental effect. 
On the externalist picture, part of the content of the concept WATER is real 
water that caused (or would cause) the subject to entertain certain thoughts. 
However, as I tried to show, an attempt to turn this view into a scientific 
description program fails. One could always decide to turn semantics into a 
theory of everything, to require of it to describe anything and everything that 
we can talk about, i. e. simply everything – but I take it that it is clear that this 
isn’t a feasible project, to put it mildly.
On an internalist account, things stand very differently. Content is 
placed exclusively in the effect (E), in mental/neural structures activated 
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while speaking, listening, and thinking. All sorts of causal relations between 
organism and environment obtain, of course, but they are not seen as con-
stitutive of content. While trying to discover the structure of our concept of 
water, or cats, and its neural underpinnings, one can rely on all sorts of ways 
of activating this structure. One can show pictures to the experimental sub-
ject, one can show real entities, one can talk about water or cats, etc. These 
are all ways to cause the concept WATER (or CAT) to be activated in the 
mind, but none of these ways are taken to be constitutive of content, and 
therefore there is no pressure to investigate scientifically this alleged constitu-
tive relation. They are just ways of eliciting content.
What to do with H20 and XYZ, the example with which causal external-
ism started? From the perspective of doing semantics, such examples could be 
seen in two ways. Either they can be construed as an invitation to do some 
chemistry – but, most semanticists probably won’t be interested in taking 
this route. Or they could be seen as showing something about our essential-
ist intuitions (although this is unclear – cf. Segal 2000: 127–8), viz. that we 
take the hidden internal structure of substances as more pertinent to their 
classification than superficial appearance. But the science of this is a science 
of an aspect of the mind/brain. Examples such as the Twin Earth thought 
experiment can be used to tease out the said intuitions and what they reveal 
about this aspect of the mind/brain. But then the route of a science based on 
such experiments goes in exactly the opposite direction from what Putnam 
intended – not from the inside out, from the mental concept to the study of 
the extension, but from the outside in. It goes from experimental situations 
where such examples are presented to experimental subjects to aspects of their 
minds and brains.
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